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ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether the Labor Commission correctly denied Buffalo and Trumbull's Motion
·-.:J)

to Set Aside Default under Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c).
Standard of Review: "We grant state agencies the same deference we afford trial

courts in setting aside default orders because UAP A has expressly incorporated the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure as the guidelines for state agencies in dealing with motions to
set aside default orders. See Black's Title, Inc., 991 P.2~ 607 (Utah App. 1999).
Therefore, we will afford the Commission's decision the same "considerable discretion"
afforded other adjudicative bodies in setting aside default orders." (Duran v. Labor
0

Commission, 182 P.3d 931 (Utah App. 2008).

Whether the Labor Commission correctly denied Buffalo and Trumbulrs Motion
to Set Aside Default under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Standard of Review: "[T]he Commission[] has 'considerable discretion under

[r]ule 60(b) in granting or denying a motion to set aside a [default] judgment' and for this
~

court to interfere, 'abuse of that discretion must be clearly shown.' "Duran v. Labor
Commission, 182 P .3d 931 (Ufah App. 2008) (quoting Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State
Ins. Dep't, 991 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999)).

APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. §34A-2- l l 3

Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c)
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
C. Nature of the case

Appellee Michael G. Torum (hereinafter "Mr. Torum") filed a claim under the
U~ah Workers' Compensation Act, seeking benefits for injuries he sustained while
working for Buffalo Wild Wings (hereinafter "Buffalo").

Mr. Torum worked in the

kitchen at Buffalo. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that on December 16, 2013,
Mr. Torum was in the walk-in freezer, the floor of which was covered in a sheet of ice.
He picked up three boxes and some bags off the shelf, which weighed about 40 pounds,
and turned to leave the freezer. When Mr. Torum turned to leave, his foot slipped on the
ice. Mr. Torum lost his balance and tried to catch himself, but fell and badly twisted his
left ankle. Mr. Torum reported this accident and injury to his supervisor, the general
~

manager. The general manager asked Mr. Torum to finish his shift, which he did, but by
the time he went home, his left ankle was swelling and throbbing.
B. Course of Proceedings

Mr. Torum filed an application for hearing with the Labor Commission on
November 25, 2014, requesting medical expenses, recommended medical care,
temporary total disability compensation, temporary partial disability compensation, travel
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expenses and unpaid interest. On December 3, 2014, the Labor Commission issued a
Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceedings and Order For Answer. This Notice was sent
V!9

to Mr. Torum and his attorney via emaiL to Buffalo via mail, and to Trumbull Insurance
Company's (hereinafter "Trumball") designated agent (CSC) via email.

CSC was

Trumball's agent that it designated to receive all notices and orders from the Labor
Commission, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-l 13.
On December 10, 2014, the Labor Com~11ission received a Rejection of Service of
Process that was sent to CSC as agent for Trumbull. On January 23, 2015, Mr. Torum
filed a Request to Enter Default. Administrative Law Judge Debbie L. Hann issued a
Default Order on January 27, 2015. On January 30~ 2015, attorneys Brad J. Miller and J.
Tyler Martin entered an Appearance of Counsel for Respondents Buffalo and Trumbull,
and also filed an Answer that same day. On February 6, 2015, Respondents' counsel
filed a Motion to Set Aside Default. After briefing by Petitioner and Respondents, on
March 2, 2015, Judge Hann entered an Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Default.
Next, Respondents filed a Motion For Review and Request For Hearing on April
1, 2015. The Labor Commission affirmed Judge Hann's decision on April 22, 2015.
Respondents then filed this appeal.
C. Disposition of the Court

On April 1, 2015, Respondents filed a Motion For Review with the Labor
Commission, seeking to set aside the Default Order.

On April 22, 2015, the Labor
3

Commission entered an Order Affirming AL.l's Decision.

On May 21, 2015,

Respondents filed a Petition For Review with this Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On May 17, 2012, Trumbull filed a Notice of Designated Agent with the Labor
Commission, listing Corporation Servic_e Company as its Designated Agent pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-113. Record, p. 1.
2. On November 25, 2014, Michael Torum filed an Application for Hearing with the
Labor Commission. Record, p. 2 - 26.
3. On December 3, 2014, the Commission sent a Notice of Formal Adjudicative
Proceedings and Order for Answer to Buffalo Wild Wings by mail and to Trumbull
Insurance Company via email to Trumbull's designated agent, Corporation Service
Company. Record, p. 27 - 28.
4. On December 10, 2014, the Commission received a Rejection of Service of
Process from Corporation Service Company. Record, p. 29.
5. On January 23, 2014, Mr. Torum filed a Request to Enter Default because no
answer had been filed. Record, p. 30 - 32.
6. A Default Order was issued on January 27, 2015. Record, p. 34- 36.
7. On January 30, 2015, Trumbull filed an Answer. Record, p. 40 - 46.
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~

8. On February 6, 2015, Trumbull filed a Motion to Set Aside Default. Record, p. 49
-73.

~

9. Administrative Law Judge Debbie L. Hann entered an Order Denying Motion to
Set Aside Default on March 2, 2015. Record, p. 93 - 96.
10. On April 22, 2015, after considering Trumbull's Motion For Review, the Labor
Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision. Record, p. 124 - 127.
11. On May 21, 2015, Trumb:ull filed this appeal.

RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant's Statement of Facts is not numbered, but is set forth in paragraphs. For
clarity, Torum shall respond with numbered paragraphs, addressing each of Appellant's
statements in the order it has been presented.

1. Agree.
2. Agree.
3. Agree.

4. Agree.
5. Agree.
6. "The Order for Answer was served on Trumbull Insurance via the Corporation
Services Company (hereinafter "CSC"). Record at 28. The Utah Labor Commission

5
·.._j)

regularly provides 'courtesy' copies of Orders for Answers to third party administrators
they know service a specific claim but in this case that was not done."
Response:

Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-1 13 requires insurance carriers to maintain a

designated agent that is registered with the Adjudication Division and is authorized to
accept service of all notices and orders. The Order for Answer was served on CSC, as

0P
Trumbull's designated agent, as well as on the employer Buffalo. This is all that is
required of the Divisi01.~; specifically, the Labor Commission is not requ_ired to send
~

courtesy copies to third party administrators or any other entity.
7. Agree.
8. "CSC had acted as a registered service agent for Trumbull Insurance through
November of 2012.

Thereafter, Hartford contracted with CT Corporation System to

replace CSC as its registered agent in Utah and nationwide for all affiliates of The
Hartford, including Trumbull Insurance. Record at 83."
Response: Torum has no knowledge of the inner workings of Trumbull or the

Hartford, and when they did or did not contract with any particular agent. The evidence
shows that on May 17, 2012, the Labor Commission received a Notice of Designated
Agent from Trumbull, which listed CSC as the agent. Record, p. 1.
9. "At the time of the change of registered agent Trumbull, as required, filed a
change of agent form with the Utah Department of Insurance, reflecting the change and
~

assigning CT Corp. as the service agent for Trumbull. Record at 83. This they believed
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was what was required of them for all actions including workers compensation
adjudications."
~

Response: Torum has no knowledge of the inner workings of Trumbull or the

Hartford, and what they did or did not believe was required of them. Utah Code Ann.
§34A-2-1 l 3 requires insurance carriers to maintain a designated agent that is registered
with the Adjudication Division and is authorized to accept service of all notices and
orders from the L~bor Commission. The evidence shows that on May _17, 2012, the Labor
~

Commission received a Notice of Designated Agent from Trumbull, which listed CSC as
the agent. Record, p. 1. No substitute or new Designation of Agent was filed with the
Adjudication Division prior to default being entered.
10. "Trumbull mistakenly believed the filed change of agent was sufficient and failed
to provide additional notice to the Utah Labor Commission's Adjudication Division as
required by 34A-2- l 13 of the Utah Code."
Response: Torum has no knowledge of the inner workings of Trumbull or the

Ha11ford, and what they did or did not believe was required of them. The plain language
of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2- l l 3 requires insurance carriers to maintain a designated agent
that is registered with the Adjudication Division and is authorized to accept service of all
notices and orders. The evidence shows that on May 17, 2012, the Labor Commission
received a Notice of Designated Agent from Trumbull, which listed CSC as the agent.
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Record, p. 1. No substitute or new Designation of Agent was filed with the Adjudication
Division prior to default being entered.
11. Agree.
12. "Trumbull did not, in fact~ receive notice of the adjudication. In addition to the
Notice of rejection of service of process sent on December 4, 2015 to the Labor
Commission two more notices were sent to the Labor Commission on January 27 and 28,
2015. Re~ord at 86, 87 ."
Response: Torum has no knowledge of what notices Trumbull did or did not
receive. Torum acknowledges that the record contains notices that appear to have been
sent by CSC to the Labor Commission.
13.

~-csc, the former registered agent, also sent another notice of rejection of service

of process. This time to Appellee's attorney on January 23, 2015. The letter again
provided notice that CSC was not the designated agent and that Trumbull would not be
receiving notice to the adjudication. Record at 88. '~
Response:

Torurn's counsel does not have record of receiving the referenced

letter, so he does not know whether the letter was actually received in his office, and if
so, the date on which is was received. However, the date on the letter is January 23,
2015. Presuming that this is the date the letter was actually mailed from CSC's offices, it
is still one day past the date on which Torum filed his Request to Enter Default with the

8

Labor Commission. Record, p. 30 - 32. Therefore, Torum would not have seen this
letter before filing.

14. Agree.
15. "'The third party administrator. Sedgwick CMS was only made aware of the
Application for Hearing when the adjuster opened an email from the Employer inquiring
about the status of the claim. Record at 51, paragraph 11."

Response:

Torum has no knowledge co1:cerning when the third party

administrator was made aware of the claim.

Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-1 l 3 requires

insurance carriers to maintain a designated agent that is registered with the Adjudication
Division and is authorized to accept service of all notices and orders. The Order for
Answer was served on CSC, as Trumbull's designated agent, as well as on the employer
Buffalo. This is all that is required of the Division.
16. Agree.
17. "Appellants immediately entered into contact with Appellee' s attorney and
~

believed that they had an agreement to stipulate to the default being set aside. However,
this was not the case and Appellant's [sic] filed a Motion to Set Aside Default on
February 6, 2015. Record at 49"

Response: Torum is baffled as to how Trumbull believes that the parties had an
agreement to stipulate to the default being set aside. Torum's counsel's notes in the file
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clearly indicate that he spoke with Trumbull's counsel on February 2, 2015 and Torum's
counsel's notes clearly state '~we are not stipulating to set aside default."

18. Agree.
19. Agree.
20. Agree.
21. Agree.
22. Agree.

_.,.

?"'

Agree.

24. Agree.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the Labor Commission's Order Affirming ALJ' s
Decision. Trumbull has not provided any basis for setting aside the default, either under
Utah R. Civ. P. 55( c) or 60(b ). Pursuant to the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §34A~

2-113, Trumbull was required to update its designated agent but failed to do so. The
Labor Commission has held in prior cases, under very similar fact patterns, that an
insurance carrier's failure to comply with Utah Code does not constitute "good cause" or
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect".

This Court and the Utah

Supreme Court have also set forth clear standards on what qualifies as "good cause",

10

'"mistake", •'inadvertence", ··surprise" or ~-excusable neglect".

Utah R. Civ. P. 55( c);

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Consequently, the Labor Commission's Order should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT
Trumbull Insurance Company seeks to have the Default Order in the case set
aside. However, it has provided no basis for doing so under either Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c)
or 60(b). It failed to follow the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-l 13, and now

it argues that the blame lies with the Labor Commission for failing to notify the Third
Party Administrator. This is contrary to statute, and does not provide "good cause'' or
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect". Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c); Utah R.
Civ. P. 60(b).

;..i)

A.
Appellant has not shown that good cause exists for setting aside the
Labor Commission's default order pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c).
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2- l 13 requires all workers compensation insurance carriers
to designate an agent who is authorized to receive '·all notices or orders provided for
under [the Act]." There is no dispute that Trumbull failed to follow this statute by not
updating its designated agent. Upon receiving Mr. Torum 's Application for Hearing, the
Labor Commission reviewed the Industrial Accident Division's records to identify
Trumbull as the insurance carrier for Mr. Torum 's employer Buffalo Wild Wings.

~

Record, p. 93. Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceedings and Order for Answer to

11

Buffalo Wild Wings and Trumbull Insurance Company was sent to Trumbull's
designated agent, Corporation Service Company (hereinafter '·CSC"). Record, p. 27 ~

28. CSC notified the Labor Commission that it was not the agent for Trumbull. Record,
p. 29. The Labor Commission had no further information on who should receive notice,
because Trumbull failed to update its designated agent.

~

Despite Trumbull's argument to the contrary, nothing in Utah Code Ann. §34A-2113 requires the Commission to s_earch for an insurance carrier's new designated agent;
nor does it require the Commission to provide notice to a third party administrator. The
responsibility to update the designated agent likes squarely with the insurance carrier.
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-l 13.
In a case with facts strikingly similar to the one at bar, the Labor Commission
Appeals Board held that no good cause existed to set aside a default when notice had
been given to the insurance carrier's designated agent. Dripps v. Lifetime Products, Case
09-0179 (2009). In that case, the insurance carrier failed to update its designated agent
~

and failed to file an answer, resulting in entry of a default order. Id.

The insurance

carrier argued to the Commission that the default should be set aside because the order
for answer was not mailed to the insurance carrier's current designated agent, and the
order for answer was not sent to the third party administrator. Id. This is precisely what
Trumbull argues in this case.
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In Dripps, the Appeals Board stated that '"the evidence confirms that at the time
the Adjudication Division sent the notice and order for answer, it was sent to [the
~

insurance carrier's] designated agent of record." Id.

It was the insurance company's

responsibility, not the Labor Commission, to ensure that notices were sent to the
appropriate office. Id. Further, the Appeals Board specifically held that the Commission
has no obligation to send notice to a third party administrator, unless that third party
administrator has been designated
as an agent. Id. Therefore, the Appeals Board
held
.
.
~

that no good cause existed to set aside the default. Id.
In the current case, just as in Dripps, the insurance carrier's failure to follow Utah
law and update its change in designated agent directly led to the default order being
entered. Any confusion regarding service of process was a result of Trumbull's inaction
and failure in its responsibilities. Just as in Dripps, under the facts and circumstances of
this case, "[i]t would be contrary to the orderly administration of the workers'
compensation system, as well as the fundamental purposes of that system, to delay

~

resolution" of Mr. Torum's claim based upon Trumball's admitted failure to follow the
plain language of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-113. Id. Trumbull cannot show that good
cause exists and therefore, the default order should not be set aside.
In addition to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-l l 3, the Commission
has held that insurance carriers "must have processes in place to ensure notices from the

~

Commission are timely acted upon." Lopez v. Insulation Systents, Inc., Case No. 11-0363
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(2011 ). Trumbull failed to have such processes in place, and yet Trumball argues that the
Commission should have taken further action to ensure that Trumbull had notice. This is
~

in direct contradiction to the statute and the Commission's own case law; rather, the
responsibility to ensure notice is received lies with the insurance carrier and not the
Commission. Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-113; Lopez.
B.
Appellant's inaction does not qualify as excusable neglect pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b ), therefore the default order should not be set aside.

1. Simplv because the law disfavors default judgments. does not mean that a partv

can disregard the plain language of Utah laws.
Trumbull argues that it should be granted relief pursuant to Rule 60(b ), because
vJ

the law disfavors default judgments. This may be true; however, it does not mean a party
has carte blanche to disregard the law and then automatically obtain relief from the
consequences of its actions. The Utah Supreme Court has held that:
"The district court judge is vested with considerable discretion under Rule
60(b) in granting or denying a motion to set aside a judgment. State ex rel.
Utah State Department of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P .2d

1053 (Utah

1983 ); A irkem lntermountain,

inc.

v.

Parker, 513

P .2d

429 (Utah 1973 ). The court should be generally indulgent toward setting a
judgment aside where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the
defendant's failure to answer and when timely application is made. Where
there is doubt about whether a default should be set aside, that doubt should
be resolved in favor of doing so. But, before we will interfere with the
trial court's exercise of discretion, abuse of that discretion must be

14

clearly shown. Russell v. Martell, 681 P .2d 1193 (Utah 1984). That some
basis may exist to set aside the default does not require the conclusion that
the court abused its discretion in refusing to do so when facts and
circumstances support the refusal. C.f Wilson v. Miller, 424 P.2d 271, 273
(Kansas 1967)."

Katz v. Pierce, 732 P .2d 92 (Utah 1986) (Emphasis added). In the case at bar, the
Labor Commission carefully considered the facts and circumstances that led to entry of
the default order against Trumbull and determined that the circurnstances did not warrant
setting aside the default.

See Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment,

Record, p. 93 - 96; Order Affirming ALJ's Decision, Record, p. 124 - 127.

Those

decisions should be affirmed by this Court unless the Court identifies abuse of discretion
in this matter.
2. The goal of the workers compensation svstem would not be furthered by
allowing Trumbull to claim ·'excusable neglect" in order to obtain relief from the
consequences of its inaction.
Trumbull also argues that the default order should be set aside, in order to
facilitate the goal of the workers compensation system and to ensure "full and fair
i.J

evidentiary proceedings" and that its failure to follow the requirements of the Workers
Compensation Act should qualify as excusable neglect pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
The Labor Commission considered a similar argument in Lopez, where the designated

15

agent had not been updated, the correct agent did not receive notice, and a default order
entered. Id. The insurance carrier in that case argued that the default order should be set
Vii

aside due to "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, ... excusable neglect ... newly discovered
evidence. . . fraud. . . or any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment." Id.

The Commission rejected this argument, holding that the insurance

carrier's failure to properly update its designated agent (as required by the plain language
of Utah law) did not justify relief from the default judgmei:it. Id.
3. The Utah Supreme Court has specificallv held that a party or the party's af;rnnt's
misunderstandirnz of clear law does not constitute excusable netdect.
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically discussed circumstances in
which an attorney misread or overlooked procedural rules. In Serrato v. Utah Transit

Authority, the court considered an attorney's failure to timely file a notice of appeal and a
subsequent 60(b) motion.

13 P.3d 616 (Utah App. 2000).

That court stated that an

equitable approach should be used when making the determination of whether a party's
~

neglect is excusable, and held that '~an equitable approach does not signify that any
neglect should rise to the level of excusable neglect. .. If such a low standard existed,
there would be no need for a rule - all movants could request an extra 30 days as a matter
of course, since the attorney will always be negligent for not filing the appeal in a timely
manner and that negligence will always be excusable." Id. At 620.

16

The Serrato court was very clear when it discussed that a party's failure to follow
clear procedural rules will not rise to the level of excusable neglect, and it cited several
~

cases to support this holding. Id.

""[E]xperienced counsel's misapplication of clear and

unambiguous procedural rules cannot excuse his failure to file a timely notice of appeal."
Lowry v. McDonnell Douglas C01p., 211 F.3d 457, 464 (8th Cir.2000); "misreading

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure does not constitute excusable neglect.'' Midwest
. Employers Cas. Co. v. Williams, 161 F.3d 877, 87~-80 (5th Cir.1998); "[A]ttorney error

based on a misunderstanding of the law was an insufficient basis for excusing a failure to
comply with a deadline." Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F .3d 996, 998
(11th Cir.1997); '·An unaccountable lapse is not excusable neglect. 'The excusable
neglect standard can never be met by a showing of inability or refusal to read and
comprehend the plain language of the federal rules'." Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Tel.
vJ)

Co., 76 F.3d 132, 133 (7th Cir.1996) (citation omitted); "[M]isinterpreting unambiguous

rules is not excusable neglect." Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928, 931-32 (9th
~

Cir.1994 ).
Trumbull argues that it mistakenly believed that it had followed the rules by filing
a change of registered agent with the Utah Department of Insurance. However, in this
case the law is clear and unambiguous; Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-l 13 requires insurance
carriers to "maintain a designated agent in this state that is: ( 1) registered with the
division; and (2) authorized to receive on behalf of the workers' compensation insurance
17

carrier all notices or orders provided for under [the Act]."

Given the clarity of this

statute, "under an equitable approach, it is unfair to [set aside the default judgment] for
~

what amounts to no excuse." Serrato, 13 P.3d 616, 620. Trumbull apparently lmew
about the need to designate an agent, because it did so when it designated CSC in 2012.

Record, p. 1. However, Trumbull failed to update its designated agent as set forth in
~

Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-113, which directly led to entry of the default order against it.
As the court in Serrato noted, if the defa_ult judgment in Serrato were set aside, this
.J

"'would so lower the requirement for what is excusable neglect", it would make Utah
Code Ann. §34A-2- l 13 meaningless. Id. Under the facts and circumstances of this case,
the Labor Commission appropriately exercised its discretion under Utah law and denied
Trumbull's Motion to Set Aside.

CONCLUSION
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-113 is clear and unambiguous.
~

The responsibility to

update the designated agent lies squarely with the insurance carrier. Trumbull's failure to
follow the plain language of Utah law by updating its change in designated agent
authorized to receive notices and service from the Labor Commission directly led to the
default order being entered. Any confusion regarding service of process was a result of
Trumbull's inaction and failure in its responsibilities, and under the Labor Commission's
established case law, this does not establish good cause for setting aside the default under
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Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c).

Likewise, the Labor Commission has considered similar

arguments under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b ), but again its established case law does not
vJJ

establish any reason for setting aside the default due to "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, .
. . excusable neglect ... newly discovered evidence. . . fraud ... or any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.'~
If this Court were to find in Trumbull's favor, then any occasion on which a party
failed to follow a rule or statute, they could claim ''excusable neglect" and obtain relief,

-.;;

making our statutes and rules meaningless. Accordingly, Torum requests that this Court
affirm the Labor Commission's Order Affirming ALJ's decision.
DATED this
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day of August, 2015.
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